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NOTES
SELING v. YOUNG: CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED BUT UNJUST CIVIL




Andre Brigham Young is considered a predator. His repeated acts of
sexual violence have qualified him for status as a sexually violent
predator. His first series of rapes began in the fall of 1962 when he broke
into four different homes and forced the female inhabitants to engage in
sexual intercourse.' Young threatened his victims with a knife in at least
two of these encounters. In another incident, Young raped a young
mother with a five-week old infant nearby.' He was convicted of these
crimes in 1963, but was released on appeal . After his release Young
attempted to rape another woman.' He was never prosecuted for this
6
offense because he was found to be incompetent to stand trial. Five years
after he was released on parole for the 1963 conviction, Young was again
convicted of rape.7 Once more, in 1980, Young was released, only to
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break into another woman's apartment and rape her in front of her three
small children.'
Pursuant to Washington State law,9 prosecutors filed a petition alleging
that Young was a "sexually violent predator."'' 0 Under the Washington
State Community Protection Act of 1990," a "sexually violent predator" is
a person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who has a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder"
that makes it likely that the individual will persist in committing crimes of• 12
sexual violence if not confined. The statute requires that sexually violent
predators be contained in a special unit at a state prison."3 This unit,
known as the Special Commitment Center (SCC), is run by the
Department of Social and Health Services rather than the Department of
Corrections. Residents in the unit are separated from the prison
population.
14
Upon finding probable cause that Young is a sexually violent predator,
a Washington State trial judge ordered Young transferred to the SCC in
Monroe, Washington. 5 In 1991, a jury heard expert testimony that Young
suffered from "(1) a severe personality disorder not otherwise specified,
with primarily paranoid and anti-social features, (2) a severe paraphilia,
which would be classified as either paraphilia sexual sadism or paraphilia
not otherwise specified (rape)" and that "the severe paraphilia constituted
a 'mental abnormality' under the sex predator commitment Statute."'6
The expert testimony further indicated that Young's condition and "the
length of time spanning Young's crimes, his recidivism record, his use of
weapons, his persistent denial of the crimes and his lack of empathy or
remorse for his victims made it more likely than not that Young 'would
commit further sexually violent acts'."' 7 The jury concluded, beyond a
8. See id.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.03 (2002).
10. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 994-95.
"11. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (2002). This statute was enacted to allow
for civil confinement of those deemed to be sexually violent predators.
12. Id.
13. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
14. See id.
15. See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 994.
16. Id. at 994-95.
17. Id. at 995.
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reasonable doubt, that Young was a sexually violent predator."'
The court committed Young to the Special Commitment Center for an
indefinite length of time. 9  Young challenged this involuntary civil
commitment on double jeopardy and ex post facto grounds. Young
argued that the effects of the statute are punitive in nature, thus offering a
commitment no different than his criminal incarceration. Further, the
statute was enacted after his criminal sentence was imposed and therefore
retroactively changed the length of the commitment he would receive for
his criminal acts.
Young argued that the divide between the SCC and the prison is only
theoretical because the Department of Corrections staff members are
actively involved in the supervision of not only the prison inmates, but of
the SCC residents as well. Young challenged his confinement in the
SCC arguing that the statute under which he was confined was an
unconstitutional violation of the ex post facto clause and the double
jeopardy clause 22 of the Fifth Amendment.23 Young stipulated that the
statute is civil in design, but that courts should inquire as to whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate
18. See id. at 995.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.90.060 (2002). The statute provides for care and
treatment "until such time as the person's metal abnormality or personality
disorder has so changed that the person is safe either (a) to be at large, or (b) to
be released to a less restrictive alternative."
Id.
20. Respondent's Brief at 3, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). Since the
inception of the civil commitment, the Department of Corrections staffs role
increased to daily security "walk throughs," continued responsibility for medical
care, meals and enforcement of requirements that residents be shackled and
dressed in prison jumpsuits when taken to the Washington State Reformatory
infirmary. See Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
21. The Washington State Community Protection Act was enacted after
Young committed the acts for which he was incarcerated. The law, he contends,
changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law provided for
when the acts were committed. Thus the law acts as an unconstitutional ex post
facto law.
22. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides: "Nor shall any
person... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb..."
23. See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 992.
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its civil intention.24 If such a judicial inquiry were to result in a finding
that the civil intention is negated, then the effect of the statute would be
criminal and thus a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Washington,
however, held that the Act was constitutional and did not violate either
the prohibition against ex post facto or the double jeopardy clause. 
2
Further, the court affirmed the sex predator determination and remanded
26the case for consideration of less restrictive alternatives.
Young then petitioned the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his
confinement was and continued to be unconstitutional. The District
Court reversed the Supreme Court of Washington and held the
Community Protection Act violated the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment, the ex post facto clause, and
28the double jeopardy clause. The State appe.aled to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." While the appeal was pending,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks.0 The Court held
that a Kansas statute, almost identical to the Washington statute, did not
violate the substantive due process, ex post facto, or double jeopardy
clauses of the United States Constitution.3 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit remanded Young's case to the District Court to be reconsidered in
32light of Hendricks. On remand, the District Court denied Young's
petition and Young again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.33 The Ninth
Circuit held that the statute was unconstitutional.34 Finally, the State
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. In
February 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
24. Respondent's Brief at 10, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
25. See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1018.
26. See id.
27. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
28. See id. at 754.
29. See Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir, 1999).
30. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
31. See id.
32. See Young v. Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1997).
33. See Young v. Weston, 898 F.Supp. 744, 754 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
34. See Young, 192 F.3d at 877.
35. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
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decision in Seling v. Young.36
Part I of this Note explains the working of the Washington Sexually
Violent Predator Act. Part II discusses the difference between the
"facial" and "as applied" tests regarding the civil versus criminal nature of
statutory interpretation. Part III analyzes why the U.S. Supreme Court
erred when it upheld the constitutionality of Washington's Community
Protection Act. Further, this Note contends that civil commitments of
sexually violent predators under the statute did not violate the double
jeopardy and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. This Note explains
the provisions of the Community Protection Act and why it survived a
properly applied facial attack. Part V of this Note further discusses the
mental health treatment necessary with regard to sexually violent
predators and the fact that those persons confined under a civil
commitment scheme are not receiving such treatment. It illustrates that
the practical effect of the statute is to deprive committed persons of their
Constitutional right to liberty while legislators and those enforcing the
statute are hiding behind a legal finding that the statute is civil on its face.
I. THE WASHINGTON SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
The Washington legislature adopted the Washington Community
Protection Act in 1990 because it found that a small but extremely
dangerous group of people exists that have "antisocial personality
features, [which] render them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior."37  Due to these personality features, such persons are not
suited to short-term civil commitments which are appropriate for others
with mental disorders."" The legislature concluded that the prognosis for
curing these sexually violent offenders is poor and long-term treatment is
39necessary.
The Act defines civil commitment as "the process by which individuals
with mental illness or mental impairments are compelled to receive care
and treatment either in inpatient or outpatient settings.' 4° The Act
36. Id.
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2002).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility:
The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v. Hendricks, 25
AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 117 (1999).
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defines a sexually violent predator as a person "who has been convicted of
or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility."4 ' The Act defines mental abnormality as a "congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others."" Predatory acts are "acts directed towards strangers or
individuals with whom a relationship has been established or promoted
for the primary purpose of victimization.,
43
After a sexually violent offender has served his criminal sentence, and
if it appears that the person may be a sexually violent predator, under the
Act the state prosecutor may file a petition alleging facts that support that
accusation. 44 Upon the filing of such a petition, a judge determines
whether probable cause exists to hold the person over for trial.4 ' An
evaluation of the individual will then be conducted by a professionally
qualified individual pursuant to the rules of the Department of Social and
Health Services. 46 The Act also includes myriad procedural safeguards to
protect those individuals subject to its terms. A trial must be conducted
within forty-five days of the probable cause hearing and the individual
47may have an examination by experts of his own choosing. Any person
subject to the provisions of the Act is also entitled to counsel and a trial
by jury.48
If the court or jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a
sexually violent predator, the person is committed to the custody of the
Department of Social and Health Services until such time as "(a) [t]he
person's condition has so changed that the person no longer meets the
definition of a sexually violent predator; or (b) conditional release to a
",49less restrictive alternative . . . is in the best interest of the person. .. .
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020 (2002).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (2002).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.040 (2002).
46. Id.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050 (2002).
48. Id.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.90.060 (2002).
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At this stage in the commitment process, procedural safeguards continue
to protect the person charged as a sexually violent predator. Each
committed person is required to be given an annual examination to
consider the possibility of a less restrictive alternative that will aid the
offender in overcoming his sexually violent tendencies while adequately
protecting the community.50 The Act allows the individual to petition the
court for conditional discharge to a less restrictive environment or
unconditional release.5 It also states that the individual may exercise
certain rights for "the purpose of obtaining release from confinement,
including the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 52 If it is
determined by mental health examiners that the person's mental
abnormality or disorder has changed in such a way that he or she
no longer meets the definition of a sexually violent predator; or
conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best
interest of the person and conditions can be imposed that
adequately protect the community, the secretary shall authorize
the person to petition the court for conditional release to a less
restrictive alternative or unconditional discharge.53
Then the prosecuting attorney general must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner's status is such that he or she is not safe to be at
large and will likely revert to "predatory acts of sexual violence.,
4
II. CIVIL VS. CRIMINAL DETERMINATION: THE ARGUMENTS FOR
"FACIAL" AND "As APPLIED" TESTS
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Petitioner and the
Respondent in Seling v. Young differed not only in their opinions as to
Young's treatment under the Washington statute, but they also differed as
to how the civil or criminal nature of the statute should be interpreted.
The State contended the Act was passed with civil intent and functions as
a civil statute.55 It argued that the U.S. Supreme Court, historically, has
evaluated statutes by applying a "facial test." Under the facial test, the
Court examines the legislative intent and effect of the statute by
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.070 (2002).
51. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (2002).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (2002).
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (2002).
54. Id.
55. See Petitioner's Brief at 12, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
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examining it on its face. 56 This means the Court looks at the actual
language of the statute to determine whether the legislature intended the
statute to be civil or criminal in nature. Young's argument was that a
facial test does not work in this case because, although the statute is civil
on its face, it is punitive as applied to his particular case.57 Case law
supports both positions. However, in Seling v. Young, the Supreme Court
applied the facial test. In fact, the Court rejected the "as applied" test
consistently in cases where it has been asked to consider a statute on an
"as applied" basis.
A. Constitutional Basis for a Facial Analysis
The Washington Community Protection Act for the civil commitment
of sexually violent predators served as the model for a similar act passed
in Kansas, which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in Kansas v. Hendricks.'8
The Washington and Kansas statutes are identical except that the
Washington Act authorizes the treatment of persons committed under its
terms in less restrictive settings than total confinement.59
Young argued that the statute should be interpreted as criminal in
nature because the double jeopardy and ex post facto constitutional
protections apply exclusively to criminal proceedings and punishments
and not to civil proceedings or remedies.6° The U.S. Supreme Court
developed a two-part test to determine whether a particular proceeding or
sanction is civil or criminal. The test, which stems from Hudson v. United
States, begins by asking "whether the legislature, 'in establishing the
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other."' 61 If the legislature intended for
the statute to be civil, the Court then looks to see "whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 'transform what
was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."' 62 The
Court applies this test to the double jeopardy and ex post facto clause
56. See id.
57. See Respondent's Brief at 3, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
58. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 387 (1997).
59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (2002).
60. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369.




In applying this test, the Hudson Court considered seven factors
enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.64 These factors are:
(1) whether the sanction [imposed by the statute] involves an
affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically
been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and
deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether
it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose
61assigned.
The Court states that these factors "must be considered in relation to
the statute on its face and only the clearest proof will override legislative
intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty." '  The Mendoza Court further held that absent any
indication that a criminal purpose was intended, the legislature's stated
civil goals enunciated by the statute control the finding of the reviewing
court.6 7
The Washington State Supreme Court applied Hudson's two-part test
and held that the Washington statute contained a civil scheme for
committing sexually violent predators.68 The Washington court found that
"the language and history of the statute so indicate, as do its purposes and
effect." 69 The Ninth Circuit concluded the statute was civil on its face and
in this regard satisfies double jeopardy and ex post facto protections.
Nevertheless, the court held the statute unconstitutional because of its
application to Young by analyzing the statute on an "as applied" basis.7°
The only question left after the Ninth Circuit holding was whether the
statute should be analyzed facially or on an "as applied basis." Kennedy-
Mendoza, Hudson, and Hendricks all hold that a facial inquiry is the
63. See e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
64. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
65. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 144).
66. Id. at 100.
67. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
68. See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 999.
69. See id.
70. See Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1999).
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appropriate approach to determining whether a statute is civil or criminal
in nature. Hudson flatly rejected the "as applied" test regarding the
double jeopardy clause. The Court in Hudson held that in determining
the purpose and effect of the statute it "must be considered in relation to
the statute on its face.",71 The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish
Hudson by stating that "Hudson involved monetary penalties and
occupational disbarment [whereas] this case involves confinement.,
72
This factual difference does not affect the legal conclusion. The approach
taken in Hudson regarding the consideration of the statute on its face is
not limited to the factual scenario in that case. Kansas v. Hendricks is the
first case the U.S. Supreme Court decided on the subject of civil
commitment of sexually violent predators.
B. Kansas v. Hendricks
In response to growing public concern regarding the criminal justice
system's inadequate prevention of repeated crimes by sex offenders,
Kansas passed the Sexually Violent Predator Act in 1994.7' The Act was
modeled after Washington's Community Protection Act. The Kansas
statute and Hendricks case became the testing ground for determining
whether a statute providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent
predators was, in fact, civil in nature.
Kansas v. Hendricks is the clearest authority for an application of the
facial test to the Washington statute. In that case, Hendricks argued that
the Kansas Act was punitive because it did not offer legitimate
treatment,74 just as Young argued in the instant case. The Court,
however, held that the Act was civil by examining the statute on its face.
The Court held:
Where the State has 'disavowed any punitive intent'; limited
confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous
individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; directed that
confined persons be segregated from the general prison
population and afforded the same status as others who have
been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is
possible; and permitted immediate release upon a showing that
the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we
71. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100.
72. Young, 192 F.3d at 874 n.4.
73. See Falk, supra note 40, at 128.
74. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346, 365 (1997).
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cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.75
The same can be said for the Washington State Sexually Violent
Predator Act. All of the factors noted by the Hendricks Court are
71included and provided for in the Washington Act.
C. Hudson v. United States
In Hudson v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that determining the civil or punitive nature of an act must begin
with reference to both Hudson's test and the Act's legislative history.
77
The Court's decision expressly disapproved of evaluating the civil nature
of an act by considering the effect the act has on a single individual.
Instead, the Court stated that the act must be evaluated by a variety of
factors "considered in relation to the statute on its face. 78
However, Young's position is very contrary to the position taken by the
Court in Hudson. Young wanted the Court to consider his individual
position and treatment to determine that the act was punitive as applied
to him. Young further wanted the Court to disregard the civil nature of
the statute and consider it on a situational basis. The precedent set by
Hendricks and Hudson illustrates that Young's proposed approach was
not the proper approach and that a facial test is appropriate.
III. THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING IN SELING V. YOUNG
The U.S. Supreme Court followed precedent in its analysis of facial
approaches to statutory interpretation in deciding Seling v. Young. The
flaw with this analysis, however, is that it ignores the practical effect the
statute has on persons in a civil commitment. In order for a civil statute to
remain civil in its effect, there must be factors that set the conditions of
the confinement apart from criminal incarceration. In Young's case the
Court began its analysis with the understanding that the Washington Act
was civil in nature. 79 The Court reiterated its finding in Hendricks that the
question whether an Act is civil or punitive is initially one of statutory
75. See id. at 368-69.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (2002).
77. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
78. Id. at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169
(1963)).
79. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 260 (2001).
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construction.8° A court must decide if the legislature intended the statute
to establish civil proceedings and a court will only reject such
interpretation when a challenging party provides "the clearest proof" that
the scheme is so punitive that it negates the legislature's intent.81
The Court agreed with the State of Washingon's approach in evaluating
the Washington State Community Protection Act. It determined that an
"as applied" analysis would prove unworkable.82 The Court explained
that such an analysis would never allow for a final resolution regarding
the overall nature of a particular scheme, but would only evaluate the
scheme for particular individuals. The only time courts would have an
opportunity to evaluate the effect of the statute would be when a person
brings the issue to court. Frequent case-by-case analysis of the statutory
scheme wastes meager resources. A one time final evaluation would
definitively answer lingering questions. The Court held that the civil
nature of a statute is not altered or divested of its civil nature simply
because there are differences in the way a particular statute is
implemented."' In sum, the Court held that "[a]n Act, found to be civil,
cannot be deemed punitive 'as applied' to a single individual in violation
of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for
release."
The Court held that persons civilly committed under the Act have a
remedy if particular commitment conditions violate the Act. According
to the Court, the appropriate remedy is a determination by Washington
courts as to whether the SCC was operating in accordance with state law;
if not, the state must provide a remedy. 8' Although recognizing that the
civil confinement scheme arose under the Federal Constitution, the Court
held that state courts are as competent as federal courts to adjudicate and
remedy any challenges to such schemes.86 Further, the Court noted that
persons committed under this Act also have an additional remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that when a person has been deprived of
"any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution," he has
80. See id. at 261.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 263.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 267.
85. See id. at 265.
86. See id.
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the right to bring an action against state actions.87
The Court's holding, although supported by precedent, fails to address
the reality of Young's situation. Moreover, it affords neither Young nor
those similarly situated the protection provided by the Constitution.
IV. KANSAS V. CRANE - THE LATEST LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY
In the recent case of Kansas v. Crane, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the decision in Hendricks while clarifying the commitment requirements.8
In Crane, the Court held that Hendricks does not require a "total or
complete lack of control" to qualify for civil confinement, only that an
individual must simply have difficulty controlling his dangerous• 89
behavior. The holding further indicates that the Court was concerned
that an "absolutist approach" would "risk barring the civil commitment of
highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities." 90 The
decision demonstrates that the Court prefers to catch more people in the
net of civil commitment rather than committing less in an attempt to
preserve individual liberty. Further, in an attempt to make the Kansas
requirements for confinement clearer, the Supreme Court manages to
lessen the precision under which a state can order appropriate
confinements. The effect of this ruling is to broaden the possibility for
individuals to qualify for civil confinement and effectively expand
criminal punishments by labeling someone as dangerous. A genuine
concern arises from this loose standard with regard to other types of
offenders who also may be likely to commit future offenses. With its
decision in Crane, the Court set the stage for offenders such as thieves,
drunk or reckless drivers, and drug dealers also to be indefinitely
committed to a state institution that provides little treatment or jail like
conditions.
87. See id; See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
88. Kansas v. Crane, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002).
89. See id. at 870.
90. Id.
2002]
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V. STATUTORILY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT
A. Washington State's Statutory Requirements
The Washington State Code requires that those persons deemed to be
sexually violent predators be committed for "control, care, and
treatment."91 Persons committed under the statute are afforded the right
to adequate care, individualized treatment and an annual examination of
their mental condition.2 At least ten states, including Washington State,
have enacted similar statutes requiring civil commitment of, and mental
health treatment for, sexually violent predators.93 The Washington statute
appears to represent the state's attempt to simultaneously protect the
community while providing mental health treatment for sex offenders. A
problem arises, however, when the treatment is not provided, as in
Young's case. Young, like others committed under the statute, is
receiving inadequate mental health treatment. As a result, his
confinement is more similar to criminal incarceration than it is to civil
commitment.
B. Constitutional Requirements for Civil Detention
The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution prevents
a state from civilly detaining those for whom treatment is available, but
who nevertheless pose a danger to others.94 The Court has held that a
state could not be viewed as furthering a "punitive" purpose by confining
dangerously insane persons for whom no acceptable treatment exists.95
However, even if the legislature intended to protect the community from
these persons by enacting the statute, it is possible that the legislature also
intended to provide treatment. In fact, the Washington statute
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (2002) (emphasis added).
92. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.070-080 (2002).
93. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 et seq. (2000); FLA. STAT ch. 394.910
(2000); IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (1999); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-29a01 (1999);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (1999); N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-27.25 (2000); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-48-20 (2000); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon
2000); VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2000).
94. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
95. See id at 366.
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specifically provides for treatment for sexually violent predators.
96
Washington has other provisions in place that indicate the legislature's
overall interest in providing adequate services for sex offenders. For
example, mental health professionals (MHPs) must be certified for sex
offender evaluation and treatment and regulations contain several
categories of certification depending on the professional's ability to meet
all of the requirements. 97  In addition, no evidence exists that sex
offenders cannot be responsive to treatment, although caution must be
exercised and each patient must be considered individually. In order for a
civil statute to remain civil in its effect there must be factors that set the
conditions of the confinement apart from criminal incarceration. There is
ample evidence that the conditions of confinement under the Washington
Community Protection Act are no different than those for a criminal
sentence. These conditions are documented through the numerous
preliminary court proceedings that are part of Young's procedural
posture.
VI. THE TURAY PROCEEDING
In 1991, shortly after the enactment of the Washington Act, another
resident of the SCC, Richard Turay, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement and inadequate
treatment at the SCC.9 A federal jury found that the SCC failed to
provide constitutionally adequate mental health treatment for the
residents of the SCC. 99 In June 1994, the federal district court entered an
injunction requiring the SCC to bring its treatment program into
compliance with constitutional standards. Noting that the Constitution
requires the state to provide a person civilly committed "with access to
mental health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve the mental condition for which they were confined,"
the injunction directed the SCC to improve the mental health treatment
96. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (2002).
97. See G. ANDREW H. BENJAMIN ET AL., LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS, WASHINGTON § 5D.25(A) (1995). The certification process
applies to any evaluation and treatment provider who provides services to adult
offenders under the Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative, WASH. REV. CODE
§9.94A.120(7), or to juvenile sex offenders under WASH. REV. CODE §12.40.160.
Id.
98. See Turay v. Seling, 108 F.Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
99. See id. at 1151-52.
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of its residents. This included hiring competent therapists, implementing a
therapy program and providing a psychologist or psychiatrist expert in
diagnosis and treatment of sex offenders9'
A Special Master completed reports regarding Turay's confinement.
These reports, as well as the Court's findings during the years since Turay
filed his complaint, reflected the state's ongoing failure to provide
constitutionally adequate treatment.'0 t In 1997, the clinical director of the
SCC admitted that the conditions of Turay's confinement were "certainly• .• 102
more restrictive than a state hospital" and were similar to incarceration.
In November 1999, the district court held the SCC in contempt for
failure to take all reasonable steps to comply with the injunction.'03 The
court ordered coercive monetary sanctions, to commence May 1, 2000,
unless compliance was achieved before that date.'04 Prior to this contempt
order, the Washington state legislature took no action to improve the
conditions at the SCC.
The SCC has housed sexually violent predators since 1990 and has
taken no action to comply with constitutionally required and statutorily
mandated conditions, including much needed mental health treatment.
The Supreme Court suggested that the availability of state level remedies
and civil actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983 has proven undependable.05 This
is evidenced by the results of the Turay proceedings. Turay filed state
actions and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but court orders have been
ignored and conditions have not improved. As a result, Young and his
fellow residents are being confined in a prison-like environment without
receiving any treatment that would distinguish this confinement from
their previous criminal incarcerations. Despite the legislature's intent that
the Washington statute be civil in nature, the statute violates the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment because the conditions of
confinement are no different than those of a criminal incarceration.
Moreover, neither Washington state nor federal law provided for the
possibility of civil commitment at the time of Young's convictions, which
led to his characterization as a sexually violent predator. Furthermore,
100. Id. at 1151.
101. Id. at 1153.
102. Respondent's Brief at 5, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
103. See Petitioner's Brief at 9, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
104. Id.
105. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. at 257.
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the decision in Young violates the ex post facto clause'06 because the
statute was enacted after he committed his acts of violence and began his
criminal sentence.
VII. APPROACHES TO TREATMENT FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATORS
A. The Historical Development of Treatment
Researcher Richard Hamill notes that convincing the public and
various legislatures that sex offenders can change their behavior is
difficult because studies of recidivism rates'o' and the effectiveness of
therapeutic models have yielded uneven results.'08 The uneven results are
partially explained by the fact that researchers must base their results on
reported crimes and a significant number of sex crimes go unreported. °9
According to Hamill, studies are also hampered by incompatible methods
of data collection and interpretation.' 0 Investigators have yet to identify
a standardized measurement technique that can reliably and validly
measure the frequency of sex offenses.' However, Hamill states that
there are increased efforts to improve the accuracy of studies regarding
criminal offenders.
112
Mental health professionals have become more effective in treating
offenders since the 1970s. Prior to this time, the problem of sexual
offense had not been completely recognized."' Treatment methods and
strategies were largely limited and ineffective. It was believed that if sex
offenders came to understand why they acted as they did they would
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 3.
107. Recidivism rates measure the rates at which offenders repeat their acts
or crimes.
108. Richard Hamill, Recidivism of Sex Offenders: What you Need to Know,
Criminal Justice, A.B.A. J., Winter 2001, 24.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Linda S. Grossman et al., Are Sex Offenders Treatable? A Research
Overview, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 349, 350 (1999).
112. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONS
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AN INVENTORY OF DATE ELEMENTS AND AN ASSESSMENT
OF REPORTING CAPABILITIES (1998).
113. Hamill, supra note 107, at 25.
2002]
528 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:511
stop."1 4 This approach, however, had little impact on recidivism, and
offenders continued to engage in their deviant acts.
The mid-1980s usherd in new strategies to address the treatment of sex
offenders.' Ineffective treatments wree abandoned as newer studies
showed that recidivism could be reduced by sixty percent through the
implementation of state-of-the-art techniques."' Today, when adults and
adolescents act out in a sexually inappropriate manner, they are referred
for specialized evaluations before they have a hearing to address their
disposition.117
B. Defining Sexual Disorders: The First Step Toward Achieving a
Reduction in Recidivism
In order to understand the various approaches to mental health
treatment, one must first understand how sexual disorders are defined.
Researcher Aviel Goodman defines sexual addiction as a condition in
which some form of sexual behavior follows a pattern that is characterized
by two features:
(1) recurrent failure to control the sexual behavior, and
(2) continuation of the sexual behavior despite significant
harmful consequences.""
Goodman explains that a sexual addiction is determined by the
relationship between a pattern of sexual behavior and an individual's
life.119 Key features that distinguish sexual addiction from other patterns
of sexual behavior are the inability of the offender to control his behavior
and significant harmful consequences that fail to stop a person from
engaging in the bahavior.'2
Paraphilias are sexual impulse disorders characterized by intensely
arousing, recurrent sexual fantasies, urges and behaviors that are
considered deviant with respect to cultural norms. These impulses
produce clinically signficant distress or impairment in social, occupational
114. Id.
115. See id. at 26.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 29.
118. Aviel Goodman, Sexual Addiction: Diagnosis and Treatment,





or other important areas of psychosocial functioning. Early sexual
psychopath laws were targeted at persons with sexual deviations or
122
paraphilias. Most rapists did not qualify for such a diagnosis until recent
years. Thus, they were not included under older laws, but are likely to be
committed under recent sexually violent predator commitment laws.'23
Treatment for all persons covered by these laws is most likely to be
successful when it involves a range of approaches, is individually tailored
124and evolves as the patient progresses.
1. Considerations Relating to Theraputic Approaches
In order for mental health treatment to be successful, several factors
must be taken into consideration. First, multiple studies indicate that
ethnic and gender differences should be considered when a sex offender is
assigned to a therapist 2 Individuals from ethnic and racial minority
groups have been reported to underutilize mental health services when
compared with those from the majority group. Furthermore, minorities
have been found to average fewer treatment sessions and to drop out of
127therapy at much higher rates. This is significant because sex offenders
who complete treatment programs have much lower recidivism rates than
128those who drop out of programs. For example, one recent study tracked
sexual offenders for five years after their release from incarceration.9
Those who completed treatment had a recidivism rate of 3.8 percent
compared to 24 percent for those who received partial treatment and 26.1
121. Martin P. Kafka, Therapy for Sexual Impulsivity: The Paraphilias and
Paraphilia-Related Disorders, PSYCHIATRICTIMES, June 1996, at 1.
122. SEE VERNON L. QUINSEY et al., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND
MANAGING RISK 120 (1998).
123. See id.
124. See Kafka, supra note 120, at 2; see also Goodman, supra note 117, at 4.
125. See Joseph A. Flaherty et al., Therapist-Patient Race and Sex Matching:
Predictors of Treatment Duration, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 1998, at 1. See also
Richard C. Friedman et al., Discussing Sex in the Psychotherapeutic Relationship,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, July 2000.
126. See Flaherty, supra note 124, at 1.
127. Id.
128. See Hamill, supra note 107, at 31.
129. Id. The study was called "The Vermont Treatment Program for Sexual
Aggressors." Id.
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percent for persons who did not receive treatment at all.
30
Another study of high risk recidivism examined age, mental status and
income as predictors of persons most likely to complete their treatment'31
program. The study found that seventy-five percent of the men age
forty to forty-nine completed treatment, whereas only fourteen percent of
offenders age twenty to twenty-four, seventeen percent of those age
twenty-six to thirty, and sixty-one percent of those age thirty-one to
thirty-nine completed treatment."' In addition, seventy-five percent of
the married or divorced participants completed the program, while only
forty-five percent of the single men completed it.'33 Finally, nearly
seventy percent of the men who earned at least eleven dollars per hour
finished the program and only twenty-six percent of unemployed
participants completed the program.134
Researcher Joseph Flaherty indicates that efforts have been made
within the mental health system to make services more attractive to men
and minority group members who chose to, or are able to, access the
system. He points out that "most training programs now include
instruction in culturally competent counseling,"'35 and that "many clinics
have implemented gender-sensitive or ethnicity-sensitive treatments.,
136
Some clinics are beginning to match the race and sex of the therapist to
that of the client. 13 Mental health experts maintain that this practice. • 138
increases offenders' acceptance of such treatment services,
Therapists continue to be aware of the differences between people and
their comfort levels when discussing sex. Because of the extremely
personal nature of therapy related to sexual deviance, successful
treatment depends on the therapist putting aside his personal sexual value
system and becoming "both empathic and knowledgeable about human
130. Id.
131. S. Sleek, Research May Help Identify Sex Offenders Most Likely to be










sexuality in order to be of assistance."" 9 The way sexual material is
expressed during therapy depends on the gender and age of the patientS 140
and, to some extent, the therapist. Sensitivity to gender, ethnic
background and sexual material facilitates all aspects of the therapeutic
process. When therapists take these factors into consideration, they can
better assess a patient's ability to receive treatment and the likelihood of
their returning to a deviant lifestyles.
2. Factors to Consider When Assessing the Possibilty of
Recidivism
Early analyses of sex offenders revealed that the frequency of
offending and the likelihood of recidivism are strongly related to the
relationship between the offender and the victim, as well as the type of
victim.' 4 ' The probability of recidivism is positively related to the number• 142
and frequency of past offenses. Offenders have a tendency to recommit
the same types of offenses instead of switching among them. Researcher
Edward Zamble found that "among the best commonly available
predictors are youthfulness and number of previous arrests.' ' 43 Age, first
arrest, alcohol abuse, substance abuse and low educational levels are also
related to recidivism rates.'44 When these factors are taken into
consideration, experts can better predict which individuals are likely to
commit future crimes and which individuals are likely to be good
candidates for treatment. Not all sex offenders have the same likelihood
of recidvism. Because treatment resources are limited, risk assessments,
taking into account all predictors of recidivism, "allow for optimal
allocation of treatment and supervision resources, as well as maximum
safety for the community.'
145
3. Drug Related Therapy
Many mental health treatment regimes involve some form of
pharmocotherapy. Traditionally, therapists have used potent
139. Friedman, supra note 124, at 1.
140. Id.
141. See Quinsey, supra note 121, at 120.
142. See id.
143. EDWARD ZAMBLE et al., THE CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM PROCESS 1 (1997).
144. Id.
145. Hamill, supra note 107, at 29.
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tranquilizers to suppress a patient's sexual drive. 4' Though temporary,
this therapy acts to immediately reduce the patient's drives in general.14'
Two different classes of drugs - antiandrogens and serotonergic
antidepressants - are available for the treatment of sexual deviance. 48 In
multiple studies, both types of drugs were shown to reduce recidivism
rates in male sexual aggressors, the group most commonly prescribed
149these drugs. Patients exhibit the effects of the drugs within two to four
weeks after the initiation of the treatment. Monitoring patients' intake
of these drugs provides a means to assure compliance of sexual predators,
persons for whom the court mandates treatment or those incapable of
taking oral medications reliably.5M These drugs also can be used to treat
motivated individuals with paraphilia-related disorders."' Further,
serotonergic antidepressantsW can treat sexual disorders by preserving
"normative" sexual desire and behaviors. 4 While these drugs have
proven effective, an individual may not respond to one drug, but may fare
better with a different drug of the same class.'
4. Psychological Treatment
The treatment of sexual offenders demands ongoing assessment of a
patient's deviant urges and behaviors."' The goals of behavioral
treatment are to normalize sexual preferences and enhance social
functioning.5 7 Sexual offenders typically are reluctant to report their true
feelings and actions for fear of legal consequences. Therefore, therapists
146. GENE G. ABEL et al., Behavioral Approaches to Treatment of the Violent
Sex Offender, in CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 95, 113 (Loren
H. Roth ed., 1987).
147. See id.
148. See Kafka, supra note 120, at 2.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 3-4.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Abel, supra note 144, at 106.
157. Arthur L. Brody et al., Washington State's Unscientific Approach to the
Problem of Repeat Sex Offenders, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 343, 346
(1994).
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rugularly will use acquired information for the purpose of further
treatment without obtaining specific information from the patient.
Techniques for assessing the patient include aversion therapy," 9 orgasmic
• 160 • 161 62reconditioning, cognitive restructuring, social skills training' and/- 163
phallometric studies. Therapists will also consider whether the offender
becomes depressed or abuses alcohol after his arrest.6 4
Many therapists recommend that treatment for sexual addiction
address both the addictive sexual behavior and the underlying addictive165. 16
process. Treatment includes relapse prevention,' 66 psychotherapy,
group counseling and pharmacotherapy.16' Therapy also seeks to induce
behavior that will help patients meet their own needs while achieving and
158. Id.
159. See id. In aversion therapy, the patient is conditioned to associate
negative stimuli with deviant sexual feelings. One negative stimulus used is
painful electrical shocks. Id.
160. See id. at 347. Orgasmic reconditioning consists of two phases. First, the
patient masturbates to orgasm while using socially acceptable fantasies. Then
they are instructed to masturbate for thirty to sixty minutes while verbalizing their
deviant fantasies. This technique allows for patients to begin to associate sexual
satisfaction with appropriate sexual themes and minimal pleasure with deviant
themes. Id.
161. See id. This form of treatment is designed to help the patient recognize
decisions and events leading up to his deviant sexual behavior. id.
162. See id. at 346. Social skills training teaches the sex offender
conversational skills, normal levels of assertiveness, and reduction in social
anxiety. Id.
163. See Quinsey, supra note 121, at 121. Phallometry involves the
measurement of male sexual arousal by monitoring changes in penis size while
stimuli are presented in a controlled fashion. Id.
164. See Brody, supra note 155.
165. See Goodman, supra note 117, at 4.
166. Id.
Relapse prevention strategies help individuals who use sexual behavior
addictively to recognize factors and situations that are associated with an
increased risk of acting out sexually, to cope more effectively with sexual
urges, to recover rapidly from episodes of symptomatic behavior and to
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maintaining a healthy lifestyle. 8
In sum, therapists can take an unlimited number of approaches to the
treatment alternatives for sex offenders. It is, nevertheless, important that
the treatment is tailored for the individual patient and provided in a
clinically accepted manner with appropriate frequency. Many mental
health experts argue that sex offender treatment can bring about• . • 169
significant reductions in recidivism. However, there are equally strong
arguments that there is no guarantee that sex offenders can be sucessfully
treated.
VIII. THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSION'S VIEW OF INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT
Many mental health professional groups and civil rights organizations
oppose the Sexual Predator Act including the National Association of
State Mental Health Program Directors (NASMHPD), the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Washington State Psychiatric
Association (WSPA)"7 After the Hendricks decision, NASMHPD issued
a statement insisting that the U.S. Supreme Court allows the states too
much discretion in defining mental abnormalities and determining
whether sex offenders pose continuing dangers to the community after
serving their criminal sentences. 7' NASMHPD further stated that
statutes for the civil commitment of persons with sexual disorders could
have severe and negative consequences for the mentally ill and the public
mental health system.'72 They cited several significant risks that could
arise from the civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders who do not
have a mental illness. First, NASMHPD was concerned that these laws
were principally punitive or for the purpose of continuing confinement,
rather than for providing treatment.'73 As such, the laws disrupt a state's
ability to provide services to patients with treatable illnesses.14  In
168. Id. at 5.
169. See Hamill, supra note 107, at 31.
170. See Brody, supra note 155, at 344.
171. See Position Statement on Laws Providing for the Civil Committment of
Sexually Violent Criminal Offenders, National Association of State Mental Health






addition, this situation would undermine the integrity of the public mental
health system.' Further risks include a misallocation of necessary and
scarce resources as well as endangering the safety of treatable patients in
the facilities.
NASMHPD's official position regarding the confinement of violent sex
offenders urges the criminal justice system to address the problem
through sentencing or other means.'77 However, they stress that if civil
commitment processes are adopted, states should consider drafting
statutes that clearly distinguish between dangerous sex offenders who do
not have a mental illness and those with mental illness."" Further,
NASMHPD recommends that facilities and treatment programs should
be funded from outside the state mental health agency to maintain the
integrity of the public mental health system because confinement and
treatment of dangerous sex offenders are beyond the scope of traditional
practices of state mental health agencies. 1 9 Finally, they urge states to
recognize that treatment programs need to be tailored for dangerous,
mentally ill sex offenders and that facilities for their confinement should
be separate from facilities for the commitment of other criminal
offenders. 8°
The ACLU and WSPA view the law as "pure preventive detention
masquerading as indeterminate psychiatric treatment."' 8' These
organizations cite the fact that sexual predation by itself is not indicative
of mental illness. '82 Further, they argue that sex offenders make up a
group of people, some of whom have mental disorders and some of whom
act without such an influence. 83
The ACLU and WSPA also argue that because sex offenders do not
necessarily have a mental illness, there is no treatment available for their
behavior, therefore these individuals will likely be detained for the
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commitment to a mental institution requires that an individual be both
mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. Mental health
professionals are concerned about the distinction between "mental
illness" and "mental disorder" that appears in the Washington
Community Protection Act. The presence of deviant sexual behavior is
not necessarily ihdicative of a mental disorder."" The problem with these
two classifications of persons is that, in order to determine whether a
person meets a legal definition, a mental health professional must diagnos
and assess the degree of a person's impairment.1 The potential for an
incorrect diagnosis is high when combining legal terms with mental health
terms and when combining legal professionals with mental health
professionals. Members of both fields must cooperate to make sure that
terms are not being used interchangeably and that individuals are
receiving the proper treatment and/or the appropriate confinement.
Mental health professionals need to be honest and not assist in "the
perpetration of a fraud" that occurs when the real goal behind the
confinement is continued incarceration and the false promise of
treatment.'8
Finally, because future behavior cannot be predicted with one hundred
percent accuracy, the result will be that sexual predators confined under
Washington's law will generally be unable to prove that they no longer
present a danger to society and therefore will not be released.89 This, in
effect, results in preventative detention that is no different from criminal
incarceration. Further, many mental health experts argue that individuals
involuntarily confined are not likely to respond to the treatment
provided.'9 This is because those confined will not believe that treatment
will help them achieve freedom. In addition, individuals without mental
illness will not respond to treatment geared to the mentally ill.
Opponents of sex offender laws argue that the criminal justice system
would better deal with sex offenders. Individuals with this view contend
that deterrence, retribution and incapacitation would be better achieved
185. Foucha v. Lousiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
186. See Rudolph Alexander, Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders to Mental
Institutions: Should the Standard Be Based on Serious Mental Illness or Mental
Disorder?, 11 J. HEALTH SOC. POL'Y 67 (2000).
187. Id. at 72.
188. Id. at 76.
189. Brody, supra note 155, at 353.
190. Id.
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through confinement in the criminal justice system than by placing the
offender in a state mental health facility.'91 The prevailing opinion
regarding civil commitment of sex offenders is that the law "offends the
prohibitions against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy by
masquerading as a civil commitment law when its purpose is penal."' 92 If
a sex offender is truly a threat to the public, this can be taken into
consideration at the time of the initial criminal sentence.' 93 Waiting until
an incarcerated sex offender is at or near the end of his sentence and then
initiating a civil commitment proceeding is, according to researcher
Rudolph Alexander, "dishonest public policy. '194 Such practices allow the
state legislature to circumvent the criminal justice system's sentencing
guidelines and keep dangerous persons away from the community at large
while failing to protect the rights of sex offenders. In his research, Adam
Falk concluded that "indeterminate and lifetime criminal sentences
provide the flexibility of indefinite civil commitment without sacrificing
the fundamental right of Americans to be free from physical restraint."' 95
Additionally, with a longer criminal sanction, the public would be satisfied
that an individual was confined based on criminal culpability and not
questionable mental diagnoses. 9'
The American Psychological Association (APA) actively opposes the
civil commitment of sex offenders after prison. Accordingly, the APA
filed an amicus brief on behalf of Hendricks in Kansas v. Hendricks. The
APA publically opposed post-release civil commitment laws, noting that
the State's "asserted interest in treatment is not strong enough to
overcome the predominantly criminal character of this confinement."' 97
In fact, the Director of the confinement facility where Hendricks was
imprisoned testified that he had "no knowledge or experience in treating
sex offenders. 1 98 The APA argues "that there is no legal basis for
indefinitely and involuntarily confining a mentally competent individual
191. Id. at 346.
192. Id. (quoting In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1019 (Wash. 1993) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting)).
193. Alexander, supra note 184, at 76.
194. Id. at 77.
195. Falk, supra note 40, at 147.
196. Id.
197. APA Opposes Penal Use of Commitment Statutes, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS,
available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/97-01-03/penal.html (Jan. 3, 1997).
198. Id.
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outside the criminal justice system on the basis of 'a psychiatrically invalid
classification category,"' because the laws create a new category called
"mental abnormality. ' 99 In support of its position, Richard Ciccone,
M.D., chair of the APA's Commission on Judicial Action, stated that "it's
understandable that states are searching for a way to deal with a serious
problem that voters are very concerned about," but legislators could
resolve the issue by lengthening prison terms for convicted sex
offenders. ° Nonetheless, the APA is concerned that "psychiatry [is]
being used to preventively detain a class of people for whom confinement
rather than treatment [is] the real goal."20' Other groups feel that civil
commitment is pursued solely for political purposes and involves
extensive civil rights violations. 2
Another reason for opposition to the civil commitment laws is an
overall lack of resources. Sex offender commitment programs are very
expensive and, according to Eric Janus, "may divert already scarce
resources from community and correctional programs., 20 3 Opponents of
civil commitment laws argue that providing treatment during prison and
supervision after release will reduce the rate of recidivism more than will
204civil commitment schemes. State officials in charge of providing these
mental health services are concerned that sex offender commitment
programs are going to drain resources from current programs that often
are inadequate.'
Many mental health professionals are not supportive of the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators. A clear message is sent when
the individuals and groups in charge of administering the commitment
199. Kansas Law on Sexual Offenders Unconstitutional, APA Comments,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/96-10-04/kansas.html
(Oct. 18, 1996).
200. COURT RULING OPENS DOOR TO ABUSE OF MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEMS,
Psychiatric News, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/97-07-18/court.html
(July 18, 1997).
201. APA OPPOSES CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS AFTER PRISON,
Psychiatric News, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/98-08-21/civil.html
(Aug. 21, 1998).
202. See Alexander, supra note 184, at 76.
203. Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and
the Behavioral Sciences, 18 BEHAV. Sci. LAW 5, 18 (2000).
204. See id.
205. See id. at 19.
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programs are opposed to the very existance of the program.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's holding that the civil commitment of
dangerous sex offenders who do not have a mental illness is constitutional
does not necessarily mean that such laws represent good policy. Civil
commitment schemes for sexually violent predators, such as the
Washington State Community Protection Act, do not afford adequate
constitutional protection to committed persons. These statutes give
legislators and members of the community piece of mind and some
additional safety, but at a high price. Piece of mind cannot be provided
solely at the expense of another's liberty. In many of the cases that
addressed the consitutionality of such confinement, there were forceful
dissents questioning the validity of such a program and its
constitutionality. For example, Justice Gardebring of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in his dissent in In re Linehan stated:
To allow the state to first choose the criminal sanction, which
requires a finding of a specific state of mind, and when that
sanction is completed, to choose another sanction which
requires a finding of the opposite state of mind, is a mockery of
justice which places both the criminal and civil systems for
206dealing with sexual predators in disrepute.
In addition, in his dissent in In re Young, Justice Johnson further
condemned civil committment statutes stating:
By committing individuals based solely on perceived
dangerousness, the Statute in effect sets up an Orwellian
"dangerousness court," a technique of social control
fundamentally incompatible with our system of ordered liberty
guaranteed by the constitution. 2°7
Despite these strong dissents, the U.S. Supreme Court through Kansas
v. Hendricks and Seling v. Young, broadened the constitutional standard
for civil commitment, reflecting less concern for individual liberties and
more concern for public safety.
Some studies and findings indicate that sex offenders can be treated.
Other studies show that treatment has not developed enough to treat the
206. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Minn. 1994) (Gardebring, J.,
dissenting).
207. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1019 (Wash. 1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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most serious offenders and those that derive sexual pleasure from their
offenses. Effective intervention in sexual offending requires close
cooperation between mental health and legal system professionals. Sex
offenders must be provided with high-quality, sex-offense-specific
evaluations so that courts can facilitate the most effective interventions
and maximize the safety of the community. Civil commitment schemes,
such as the one in Washington, have not yet shown to be helpful in this
regard. In fact, the evidence regarding Young's particular commitment is
showing just the opposite - individuals committed at the SCC are not
receiving the treatment necessary for them ever to be released from
confinement. The practical effect of the civil commitment law is to keep
the offender off the street and protect the community with little to no
regard for the future and well being of the offender himself. These civil
institutions have not proven to differ much from criminal institutions with
the exception of their label. Prisons are not designed nor intended to be
therapeutic environments. Similar institutions, without proper personnel
and resources, cannot function as therapeutic environments. It would
seem that society has unintentionally shifted the burden of caring for
many mentally ill individuals from the mental health system to the
criminal justice system by enacting civil commitment schemes that do not
differ from criminal incarceration on a practical level. Falk notes that this
standard "undermines the moral foundations of criminal law and the
moral neutrality of the mental health system."209
A former governor of Virginia expressed dismay that he was "forced to
authorize the confinement of persons with mental illnesses in the
Williamsburg jail, against both his conscience and the law," because of the
lack of appropriate services.f That was in 1773. Over two hundred
years have passed and America is still facing similar problems. If the
mentally ill do not belong in prison, than they also do not belong in
environments that substantively are no different from prison.
Some studies indicate that clinicians are increasingly better able to
evaluate and treat sex offenders. Research continues to be refined,
producing more successful evaluation and treatment techniques. Because
sex offenders who successfully complete treatment have a substantially
208. Falk, supra note 40, at 147.
209. Representative Ted Strickland, Mentally Ill Don't Belong in Prison,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, available at http://www.psych.org/pnews/99-12-17/prison.html
(Dec. 17, 1999).
210. See id.
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lower recidivism rate, positive intervention relies on the cooperation of
legal and mental health professionals. By working together, the legal and
mental health professions can provide sex offenders with necessary
treatment, protect the offenders' Constitutional rights and enhance
community safety. However, for those individuals who cannot be treated,
the future is grim. These persons have little hope of ever being released
from their confinement because they are not capable of being treated for
their deviancy and still pose a potential threat to the community. State
legislatures instead should consider handling this problem through the
criminal justice system with increased sentences for sex offenders.
Criminals should not be stripped of their constitutional protections in
order to ease the fears of the community.

